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I. OVERVIEW
When a person makes a long distance telephone call, telephone com-
pany equipment automatically makes a record of the numbers dialed.' If
law enforcement officials want to know what long distance calls were com-
pleted from a particular telephone, such information can be obtained by
subpoenaing the telephone company's records. 2 On the other hand, except
under unusual circumstances, no automatic record is made of the local
calls dialed from a telephone. Information concerning local calls, there-
fore, is normally not available to law enforcement officials, either by re-
quest or subpoena, because for all practical purposes such information
never existed. A special device, generally known as a pen register or
touch-tone decoder,' is required to record the local numbers dialed from a
particular telephone.
Telephone companies use pen registers in a variety of situations unre-
lated to criminal investigations. For example, if a subscriber claims that
he is being billed for long distance calls that were never made, the tele-
phone company might use a pen register to check the accuracy of its auto-
matic recording equipment. Conversely, if the telephone company
suspects that a subscriber is using an illegal device to avoid being billed for
long distance calls, the telephone company might use a pen register to de-
termine whether this is being done. 4 Additionally, if a subscriber is receiv-
ing obscene or harassing calls and suspects that a particular person is the
caller, the telephone company might install a pen register on the suspect's
telephone to ascertain whether such calls are being made from that tele-
phone.
Indeed, federal law expressly permits a telephone company, upon its
1. This is common knowledge to anyone who has ever received a long distance tele-
phone bill.
2. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
3. A pen register is a mechanical device, usually installed at a central telephone com-
pany facility, that records on paper the numbers dialed from a particular telephone by moni-
toring the electronic impulses caused when the dial is rotated. Such a device reveals only the
numbers that have been dialed. It does not enable anyone to hear any of the communica-
tions transmitted. Thus, a pen register discloses neither the subject of a communication
between the caller and the recipient, their identities, nor whether the call was even com-
pleted. A touch-tone decoder accomplishes the same results, with the same limitations, on a
touch-tone telephone. See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161, 167
(1977); United States v. Caplan, 255 F. Supp. 805, 807 (E.D. Mich. 1966). See generally
Claerhout, The Pen Register, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 108, 109-10 (1970).
4. See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174-75. See generally Note,
The Legal Constraints Upon the Use of the Pen Register as a Law Enforcement Tool, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 1028, 1029 (1975).
5. See Claerhout, supra note 3, at 11; Comment, Pen Register Evidence With One-
Party Consent.- Should It Be Admissible?, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 425, 429 (1971).
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own initiative, to use pen registers for legitimate business purposes. 6 If the
telephone company's use of a pen register or other detection device uncov-
ers evidence of criminal conduct, that evidence is admissible at the defend-
ant's trial.7 Moreover, the person whose telephone was subjected to such
surveillance has no fourth amendment8 grounds upon which to suppress
the evidence; only searches and seizures conducted by state or federal offi-
cials are subject to constitutional limitations.9 Different legal issues arise,
however, when law enforcement officials conduct pen register surveillance
or when a telephone company conducts such surveillance at the behest of
the police.'" The Supreme Court has squarely confronted these issues on
two occasions.
The first case presented the question whether law enforcement use of a
pen register constituted wiretapping, which is permissible only when con-
ducted pursuant to a special and difficult-to-obtain eavesdropping order."
6. Under 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(a)(i) (1976), a communications common carrier may "in-
tercept, disclose, or use" a communication carried over its facilities if such activity is a neces-
sary incident to the service the carrier provides or is necessary to protect "the rights or
property" of the carrier.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Goldstein, 532 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 429 U.S.
960 (1976); United States v. Sorota, 515 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Clegg, 509
F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1975); People v. Smith, 31 111. App. 3d 423, 333 N.E.2d 241 (1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 940 (1976); State v. Hruska, 219 Kan. 233, 547 P.2d 732 (1976). The above
listed cases arose out of prosecutions for theft of the telephone company's services. Con-
cerning the use of pen register evidence in prosecutions for making obscene or harassing
calls, see State v. Droutman, 143 N.J. Super. 322, 362 A.2d 1304 (1976). See also Hodge v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1977) (civil action against telephone
company by person convicted on basis of evidence obtained through telephone company use
of pen register; trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of company affirmed).
8. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487-88 (1971) (dictum); Bur-
deau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475-76 (1921); United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391, 398
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1127 (1975); United States v. Valen, 479 F.2d 467,
469 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 901 (1974).
10. When a private individual or entity acts at the request of the government, he is
considered a government agent for fourth amendment purposes. His conduct, therefore, is
subject to fourth amendment standards and restrictions. See, e.g., United States v. Ogden,
485 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1973); Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966); Stapleton
v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 97, 447 P.2d 967, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1968); State v. Scrotsky, 39
N.J. 410, 189 A.2d 23 (1963). See also Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949). See
generally 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 114 (1978).
11. Law enforcement use of wiretapping and bugging to overhear conversations is regu-
lated by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2520 (1976). See generally C. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING (1978).
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In United States v. New York Telephone Co. ,2 the Court first ruled that an
ordinary search warrant sufficed to authorize law enforcement use of a pen
register.' 3 Additionally, the Court ruled that a federal district judge pos-
sessed the authority to include within the search warrant an order compel-
ling a telephone company to assist the government by installing a pen
register on the targeted telephone. 4
In Smith v. Maryland,'5 the Court considered the legality of pen register
surveillance conducted by a telephone company pursuant to an informal
police request, that is, without a warrant or other court order. 6 In holding
When government officials obtain a Title III order authorizing them to conduct a wiretap, it
is common practice for the agents to use a pen register in conjunction with the tap. Several
courts have held that such use of a pen register is lawful even if the Title III order does not
contain an express provision authorizing its use. See United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478,
481-83 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass.
224, 327 N.E.2d 819, 850 (1975); State v. Murphy, 137 N.J. Super. 404, 349 A.2d 122, 138-39
(1975).
12. 434 U.S. 159 (1977). The government was investigating whether two telephones
were being used to conduct illegal gambling operations and obtained a search warrant pur-
suant to rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court order authorized the
use of pen registers on the telephones and directed the company to furnish the F.B.I. with
"all information, facilities and technical assistance" necessary to employ the devices. 434
U.S. at 161. The telephone company moved to vacate the order, arguing that only an order
issued pursuant to Title III could authorize governmental use of pen registers or direct the
company to provide information or assistance. 1d at 163.
13. 434 U.S. at 165-68. The Court found support for this conclusion in rule 57(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides: "If no procedure is specifically pre-
scribed by rule, the court may proceed in any manner not inconsistent with these rules or
with any applicable statute." The Court then commented: "[W]e need not and do not de-
cide whether Rule 57(b) by itself would authorize the issuance of pen register orders." 434
U.S. at 170.
14. Id at 171-78. The Court concluded that the district judge's authority to compel the
telephone company to provide assistance is derived from the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1651(a) (1976), which provides: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 434 U.S. at 172. Although the Court
acknowledged that the All Writs Act did not authorize federal district courts to impose "un-
reasonable burdens" upon third parties, the district judge's order in New York Tel. Co. was
in no way burdensome and even required the government to compensate the telephone com-
pany at the prevailing rates. Id at 175.
The Court's reliance on the All Writs Act and its discussion of rule 57(b) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, see note 13 supra, have assumed additional significance in
light of subsequent developments. See notes 175-83 and accompanying text infra.
15. 99 S. Ct. 2577 (1979).
16. The Court granted certiorari "in order to resolve indications of conflict in the de-
cided cases as to the restrictions imposed by the Fourth Amendment on the use of pen
registers." Id at 2579. Prior to Smith, federal and state courts were divided as to whether
the fourth amendment required law enforcement officials to obtain a search warrant before
conducting pen register surveillance with telephone company cooperation. For cases hold-
ing or indicating in dicta that a search warrant must be obtained, see, e.g., Application of the
[Vol. 29:557
Pen Registers and Privacy
such pen register use lawful and the evidence obtained admissible against
the defendant at his robbery trial, the Court held that no "search" had
occurred and thus no right to privacy protected by the fourth amendment
was invaded.' 7
Although the result in Smith is supportable under the particular facts of
the case, the Court's reasoning poses significant problems of both statutory
and constitutional dimensions. As will be demonstrated below, the major-
ity opinion relied on unsupportable factual assumptions, effectively nulli-
fied congressional intent, and introduced an absurd anomaly into federal
law. Ironically, however, while the Smith decision has unsettling implica-
tions for the right to privacy, it is likely to have little if any impact upon
law enforcement use of pen registers.
II. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, AND
FEDERAL LEGISLATION
To place the Supreme Court's decision in Smith in historical context,
this section will briefly examine the exclusionary rule, trace its application
to electronic surveillance, and highlight legislation governing electronic
surveillance by federal officials.
Although the fourth amendment ensures that persons will not be subject
to "unreasonable" searches and seizures and requires that warrants be
based on probable cause and "particularly describe the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized,"" it does not contain an
express remedy for persons whose security has been violated. In 1914,
however, in Weeks v. United States, 9 the Supreme Court espoused a prin-
ciple that has come to be known as the "exclusionary rule": if law enforce-
ment officials conduct searches or seize evidence in a manner that violates
a defendant's fourth amendment rights,20 such evidence cannot be used
United States for an Order, 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978);
Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing Use of Pen Register, 538 F.2d 956
(2d Cir. 1976), rep'don other grounds sub nom. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S.
159 (1977); United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Finn, 502 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1974); State v. Ramirez, 351 A.2d 566 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976);
Commonwealth v. Caviello, 362 Mass. 722, 291 N.E.2d 416 (1973). But see United States v.
Clegg, 509 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1975); People v. Turner, 35 I11. App. 3d 550, 342 N.E.2d 158
(1976), holding or indicating in dicta that no search warrant is required. See also United
States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); Common-
wealth v. Stehley, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 150, 338 A.2d 686 (1975).
17. 99 S. Ct. at 2581-83. See notes 55-78 and accompanying text infra.
18. See note 8 supra.
19. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
20. Defining the exact parameters of standing to object to an illegal search and seizure
is a matter of great controversy. See, e.g., 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 543-612; Grove,
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against the defendant in a criminal prosecution. 21
Initially, the exclusionary rule had little impact upon electronic surveil-
lance. In Olmstead v. United States,22 the Court held that the fourth
amendment was inapplicable to wiretapping unless government officials
had physically invaded the defendant's premises. The Court interpreted
the fourth amendment's prohibition against "unreasonable searches and
seizures" as meaning an unreasonable physical invasion.23 Since wiretap-
ping did not involve a physical trespass, the Court reasoned that no
"search" had occurred.24 A decade later in Nardone v. United States,25 the
Court construed section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 193426
as creating a statutory prohibition against unauthorized wiretapping by ei-
ther government officials or private citizens. 27 Thus, evidence obtained in
Suppression of Illegally Obtained Evidence: The Standing Requirement on its Last Leg, 18
CATH. U.L. REV. 150 (1968); Gutterman, .4 Person Aggrieved" Standing to Suppress Illegall,
Seized Evidence in Transition, 23 EMORY L.J. 111 (1974); White & Greenspan, Standing to
Object to Search & Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 333 (1970). With respect to standing to
contest allegedly illegal wiretapping and bugging, see C. FISHMAN, supra note 11, at 390-
401, 419-20.
21. 232 U.S. at 398. The rule enunciated in Weeks applied only to evidence seized by a
federal agent that was used by a federal prosecutor; the Weeks Court concluded that the
fourth amendment's limitations were inapplicable to evidence seized by state officials. Id at
398. Not until 1949, in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), did the Court hold that the
fourth amendment was enforceable against the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Moreover, it was not until 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), that the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule was enforceable against the
states.
Proponents of the exclusionary rule have justified it as a necessity to give meaning to the
fourth amendment right of privacy, to deter police misconduct by removing the incentive for
illegal searches and seizures, and to preserve the integrity of the judicial system. See, e.g.,
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 654-59; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 392-93. Opponents of
the rule argue that it is based on an unrealistic concept of the criminal justice system, that
the rule has not and cannot have any significant deterrent effect on police misconduct, and
that the cost to society - suppression of probative evidence of guilt and the resultant freeing
of thousands of "guilty" criminals - far outweighs whatever minimal benefits the rule
otherwise provides. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 412-24
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting), and sources cited therein. For a concise history of the ex-
clusionary rule, see Miles, Decline of the Fourth Amendment." Time to Overrule Mapp v.
Ohio, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 9, 29-52 (1977).
22. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
23. Olmstead had been convicted of violating the National Prohibition Act by trans-
porting and selling intoxicating liquor. The government had obtained its evidence against
Olmstead through wiretapping. Id at 455-57.
24. Id at 465-66.
25. 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
26. Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934) (current
version at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976)).
27. 302 U.S. at 382.
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violation of the Act was inadmissible in federal prosecutions.2" Subse-
quently, in Goldman v. United States,29 the Court reiterated its Olmstead
ruling that the electronic overhearing of conversations without a physical
trespass onto the defendant's premises did not constitute a search within
the meaning of the fourth amendment.30
Not until 1961, in Silverman v. United States,3 did the Court for the first
time suppress the fruits of electronic surveillance on constitutional
grounds. In Silverman, the Court held that by driving a "spike mike" sev-
eral inches into a party wall of the suspects' house, the agents had commit-
ted an illegal trespass that constituted an illegal search.32 A similar result
was reached in Clinton v. Virginia,33 involving a listening device that pene-
trated no more than a thumbtack deep.
The Court finally abolished the physical trespass requirement in Katz v.
United States.34 Government agents, acting with probable cause but with-
out a warrant, placed a listening device on the outside of a public tele-
phone booth. The agents overheard what Katz said during two telephone
conversations and so testified at Katz's gambling trial. The litigants had
approached the case in terms of whether a telephone booth was a "consti-
tutionally protected area" and whether physical penetration into such an
area had to occur before a defendant could invoke the fourth amendment's
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.35 The Court,
however, "decline[d] to adopt this formulation of the issues.' '36 Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority, stressed that the interests protected by
28. In the second Nardone case, the Court held that evidence derived from wiretapping
in violation of the Federal Communications Act must be suppressed. Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). Cf. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952) (statute does not
render evidence obtained in violation of the Act inadmissible in state courts). See also
Rathburn v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957) (no statutory violation when agent listening
to conversation had the consent of one party).
29. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
30. Id. at 133-36. In Goldman, federal agents overheard conversations between defend-
ants Goldman and Shulman by pressing a listening device against the wall of an office ad-
joining Shulman's. Since there had been no physical trespass into Shulman's premises, the
Court reasoned that no search had occurred. Id
31. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
32. Id. at 509-10.
33. 377 U.S. 158 (1964).
34. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See generally Note, The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy -
Katz v. United States, a Postscriptum, 9 IND. L. REV. 468 (1976); Note, From Private Places
to Personal Privacy.- A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protections, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV.
968 (1968).
35. 389 U.S. at 349-50.
36. Id. at 350.
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the fourth amendment were not limited to those of property and freedom
from physical trespass. The Court emphasized:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected.37
Katz, therefore, eliminated constitutional distinctions based solely on the
existence of a physical intrusion and freed the fourth amendment from the
constraints of property law. 38 But while "the fourth amendment protects
people, not places," the real question, as Justice Harlan pointed out in his
concurring opinion, is "what protection [the fourth amendment] affords to
those people.",
39
Before a fourth amendment search and seizure can be said to have oc-
curred, someone seeking to suppress evidence must satisfy a two-fold re-
quirement: "first that a person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society
is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' 4
Since Katz, fourth amendment litigation has often focused on whether a
particular defendant had a reasonable, "legitimate," or "justifiable" expec-
tation of privacy.4' In particular, the Court has frequently held that when
a person reveals information to a second party, he assumes the risk that the
second party will disclose that information to government officials; no con-
stitutionally recognized expectation of privacy is violated if the second
party in fact discloses what has been revealed.42
Two federal statutes govern the use of electronic surveillance. Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196843 regulates
wiretapping and eavesdropping by law enforcement officials. 44 The For-
37. Id at 351 (citations omitted). Although the agents had probable cause to believe
that Katz's conversations would be incriminating and acted with restraint by listening only
when Katz was in the booth, the Court suppressed the agents' testimony as to what Katz said
because the agents had failed to obtain a warrant authorizing the use of the listening device.
Id at 356-57.
38. Amsterdam, Perspectipes on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 357-58
(1974).
39. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
40. Id
41. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 99 S. Ct. 2586 (1979), and authorities cited therein.
See generaly Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Priacy Test, 76 MICH. L.
REV. 154 (1977).
42. See note 63 and accompanying text infra.
43. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976). See notes 94-109 and accompanying text infra.
44. Title III authorized states to enact similar legislation which could be more restric-
tive but not more permissive than Title Ill. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1976). See S. REP. No.
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eign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 19784 regulates the use of electronic
surveillance by federal officials for national security purposes. The aspects
of these statutes relating to pen registers will be discussed in detail below.
III. Smith v. Maryland
The pertinent facts in Smith are readily stated. A robbery victim who
had provided the police with a description and other information concern-
ing the perpetrator began receiving threatening and obscene telephone
calls from a man claiming to have committed the robbery. Because the
investigation focused suspicion on Smith, the police requested that the tel-
ephone company employ a pen register to record the numbers dialed from
Smith's home telephone.46 The telephone company complied, installing
the pen register at its central offices. The police did not seek a search war-
rant or other court order authorizing the use of the pen register.4 7 The day
after its installation, the register revealed that a call was placed from
Smith's home telephone to the victim's home telephone.4" Relying on this
fact and the other information provided by the victim, the police obtained
a search warrant for Smith's home. The search revealed that a page in
Smith's telephone book was turned down to the victim's name and
number. The book was seized, Smith was arrested, a lineup was held, and
the victim identified Smith as the robber.49
Prior to trial, Smith moved to suppress all evidence derived from the use
of the pen register on the ground that the failure of the police to obtain a
warrant prior to the register's installation rendered its use an illegal search
and seizure.50 The trial court denied the suppression motion, and the Ma-
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 89, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2177.
For a listing of such state laws, see C. FISHMAN, supra note 11, at 6.
45. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (Supp. 11 1978). See notes 110-20 and accompanying text
infra.
46. 99 S. Ct. at 2578. The police may have had probable cause for a search warrant
authorizing the use of the pen register on Smith's telephone. The victim had given the police
a description of the robber and his automobile. In one of the calls, the self-proclaimed
robber asked the victim to step out on her front porch; she did so and saw the same car that
she had previously described to the police moving slowly past her home. A few days later, a
police officer observed a man fitting the victim's description of the robber driving a car of the
same year and make in the victim's neighborhood. By tracing the license plate number, the
police learned that the car was registered to Smith. Id Although the telephone company
had traced some of the calls to a public telephone booth, the victim indicated that at least
one of the calls seemed to have been made from a private residence. See Smith v. State, 283
Md. 156, 158, 389 A.2d 858, 859 (1978).
47. 99 S. Ct. at 2578.
48. Id at 2578-79.
49. Id at 2579.
50. Id
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ryland Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, because no "search" had
occurred, no warrant was required.5'
As noted earlier, Katz52 established that official conduct 53 constitutes a
search and seizure subject to fourth amendment restrictions only if that
conduct intrudes upon a person's expectation of privacy. And an expecta-
tion of privacy qualifies for fourth amendment protection only if two re-
quirements are met: first, the individual by his conduct must have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, such
expectation must be one that society recognizes as reasonable. 4
As an initial matter, the Smith Court ruled that pen register surveillance
did not intrude upon a property right of Smith's because the register was
installed at a central telephone company facility, not in his home, and the
contents of Smith's conversations were not overheard. 5 Thus, the Court
defined the issue as whether Smith had a "legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy" regarding the numbers he dialed on his home telephone. After ex-
amining the facts, the Court held that he did not.
A. Subjective Expectations of Privacy
In reaching its decision, the Court first questioned whether Smith actu-
ally harbored a subjective expectation of privacy concerning the numbers
he dialed from his home telephone. People generally do not entertain such
expectations, the Court reasoned, since the public "knows" that the tele-
phone company has equipment capable of recording such numbers and
does so for a variety of legitimate business purposes. 56 In particular, "most
people. . . presumably have some awareness of one common use [of pen
registers]: to aid in the identification of persons making annoying or ob-
51. Id. See Smith v. State, 283 Md. 156, 173-74, 389 A.2d 858, 867-68 (1978).
52. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
53. The Smith Court noted that the pen register was installed at the request of the
police, and the State apparently conceded that the telephone company was acting as a police
agent rendering use of the register "state action" under the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments. The Court, therefore, assumed that "state action" was, in fact, present. 99 S. Ct. at
2579-80 n.4. Nevertheless, it is not altogether clear that the state's concession or the Court's
acceptance of the existence of state action was truly necessary. See note 76 infra.
54. See Smith v. Maryland, 99 S. Ct. at 2580 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)); notes 34-42 and accompanying text supra.
55. 99 S. Ct. at 2581.
56. The Court noted that subscribers receive a list of their long distance calls on their
monthly statements and that pen registers are used to detect fraud, to record numbers dialed
from telephones subject to a special rate structure, to determine whether a home telephone is
being used for business purposes, to check for a defective dial, and to check for overbilling.
Id at 2581. However, the Court conceded that "most people may be oblivious to a pen
register's esoteric functions. ... Id
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scene calls."57 Upon thisfactual assumption, the Court reasoned that "it is
too much to believe that telephone subscribers ...harbor any general
expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret."58 Additionally,
the Court deemed irrelevant the fact that the telephone in question was
located in Smith's home:
Regardless of his location [when he made the call], petitioner had
to convey that number to the telephone company. . . .The fact
that he dialed the number on his home phone rather than on
some other phone could make no conceivable difference, nor
could any subscriber rationally think it would.59
The factual assumptions underlying the Court's decision in Smith are, at
57. Id As evidence of such public awareness, the Court stated that most telephone
directories contain a page entitled "Consumer Information," informing subscribers that the
telephone company "can frequently help in identifying to the authorities the origin of un-
welcome and troublesome calls." Id
Dissenting from the Court's opinion, Justice Marshall derided "the Court's apparently
exhaustive knowledge of this Nation's telephone books and the reading habits of telephone
subscribers" and refused to assume "general public awareness of how obscene phone calls
are traced." Id at 2548 n.I (Marshall, J., dissenting).
As pointed out by Justice Marshall, the majority's assumption that the public has any
precise notion of how a telephone company identifies the source of an annoying call is in-
deed dubious. If pressed to speculate as to how this might be accomplished, most individu-
als would probably assume that the telephone company would attempt to trace the call
backwards from the recipient telephone to the sending telephone. In fact, Smith himself
may have - accurately - made such an assumption. The telephone company had traced
some of the calls from the victim's telephone back to a public telephone located in the vic-
tim's neighborhood. See State v. Smith, 283 Md. at 158, 389 A.2d at 859.
Furthermore, the consumer information page of most telephone books is unlikely to en-
lighten even the most avid reader. To research this question, directories from fifteen cities
were examined: Atlanta, Ga. (1978); Boston, Mass. (1979); Buffalo, N.Y. (1979); Dallas,
Tex. (1979); Denver, Colo. (1978); District of Columbia (1979); Los Angeles, Cal. (1979);
Manhattan, New York City (1978-79); Miami, Fla. (1977-78); Omaha, Neb. (1979-80); Phil-
adelphia, Pa. (1978); Phoenix, Ariz. (1979); Rochester, N.Y. (1979); San Diego, Cal. (1979);
Tulsa, Okla. (1978). None of these directories mentioned any special equipment or special
procedures under the heading of "Annoyance Calls." Eight directories did mention special-
ized equipment, however, under the heading "Fraudulent Use of the Telephone," without
explanation of the nature and use of the equipment. See the directories for the cities of
Atlanta; Boston; Buffalo; Dallas; District of Columbia; Manhattan; Rochester; Tulsa.
On the other hand, all fifteen directories contained a heading entitled "Illegal Wiretap-
ping." There, the reader could learn that it is illegal to intercept a phone call without the
consent of a participant and that the telephone company would not install a wiretap on any
telephone for the police unless presented with a warrant.
It is unlikely that the general public, unaware of the niceties of telephone technology or
constitutional law, would distinguish between a wiretap, which requires a special court order
to authorize overhearing conversations, and a pen register, which merely records the num-
bers dialed. If anything, the consumer information page of these directories would increase,
rather than diminish, the reader's sense of security in the privacy of his telephone.
58. 99 S. Ct. at 2581.
59. Id at 2582.
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best, dubious. A telephone company rarely makes a record of the local
numbers dialed from a telephone. When it does, such records are used
only for valid internal business purposes relating to the service the tele-
phone company provides its subscribers. 60 Moreover, there was no evi-
dence before the Court that the average telephone user is aware of the
circumstances under which such a record will be made.6' Thus, it is more
reasonable to assume that the absence of a listing of local calls on monthly
telephone bills leaves most subscribers with the accurate impression that
the telephone company does not record such numbers. In sum, the Smith
Court's holding that society does not expect privacy with regard to local
numbers dialed is patently inaccurate.
B. Reasonable Expectations, Assumption of Risk
Notwithstanding that Smith "did harbor some subjective expectation
that the phone numbers he dialed would remain private," the Court held
that such expectation "is not one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' ' 62 The Smith majority reasoned that whenever a person vol-
untarily reveals information to a third person he "assumes the risk" that
the third person will disclose the information to the authorities.63
When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed nu-
merical information to the telephone company and "exposed"
that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of busi-
60. See notes 4, 5, 56 and accompanying text supra.
61. See note 57 supra.
62. 99 S. Ct. at 2582.
63. Id In support of its "assumption of risk" theory, the Court cited United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973);
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion); Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). See 99 S. Ct. at 2582.
In Hoffa, the Court held that when a suspect voluntarily reveals information to a govern-
ment informant, such information is not subject to fourth amendment protection. 385 U.S.
at 303. In Lopez, the Court held that no warrant is required to authorize a government
agent to tape record his conversation with a suspect. 373 U.S. at 439. Similarly, White held
that no warrant is required to authorize an agent to transmit electronically his conversation
with a suspect to other agents. 401 U.S. at 751. See generally Fishman, The Interception of
Communications Without a Court Order." Title III, Consent, and the Expectation of Privacy,
51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 41 (1976). See also Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping
& Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring with the Consent of a Particioant in a Conversa-
tion, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 189 (1968); Comment, Eavesdropping, Informers and the Right of
Privacy." A Judicial Tightrope, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 975 (1967).
In Couch, the Court upheld an Internal Revenue Service summons requiring Couch's
accountant to surrender Couch's business records. The Court ruled that Couch had volunta-
rily revealed the records to her accountant knowing that the accountant would have to dis-
close much of the information when he filed Couch's tax return. Therefore, the Court
reasoned that Couch had no reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the records.
409 U.S. at 335.
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ness. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.
64
In support of its "assumption of risk" theory, the Court quoted exten-
sively from United States v. Miller.65 In Miller, the Court held that when a
depositor "reveals" his financial affairs to a bank (by writing checks, filling
out deposit slips, and the like), he or she assumes the risk that the bank will
disclose this information to the government.66 The depositor, therefore,
has no reasonable expectation of privacy if the bank actually does SO.
6 7
The Court's reliance on Miller to support an assumption of risk ration-
ale in the context of electronic surveillance is rather tenuous. Miller is
distinguishable from Smith on several significant grounds. First, Smith's
reliance on Miller is inapt because bank records are regulated by a special
statute, the Bank Secrecy Act.68 This statute's sole purpose is to require
banks to preserve records of customer transactions so that they will be ac-
cessible to law enforcement officials pursuant to legal process.69 No com-
parable statute requires telephone companies to maintain records of either
local or long distance calls.7" Second, in Miller, the government obtained
the depositor's records pursuant to legal process.7 In contrast, the tele-
phone company in Smith installed the pen register and preserved and re-
64. 99 S. Ct. at 2582 (emphasis supplied). The Court emphasized, and Smith conceded,
that if he had placed his calls through an operator who subsequently disclosed the number
called to the police, Smith would have had no legitimate expectation of privacy. The Court
reasoned that no different constitutional result is required "because the telephone company
has decided to automate." Id However, this analogy to a live telephone operator is inappo-
site. See notes 79-84 and accompanying text infra.
65. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). For a harsh criticism of Miller, see Alexander & Spurgeon,
Privacy, Banking Records and the Supreme Court. A Before andAfter Look at Miller, 10 Sw.
U.L. REV. 13 (1978).
66. 425 U.S. at 442-44.
67. See Alexander & Spurgeon, supra note 65, at 29-32.
68. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(2) (1976) (maintenance of records by insured banks); id §
1730(d) (1976) (maintenance of records by savings and loans) (1976); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
1122 (1976) (reporting of currency transactions). The constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy
Act was upheld in California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). See generally
Note, California Bankers Association v. Schultz. An Attack on the Bank Secrecy Act, 2 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 203 (1975). See also LeValley & Lancy, The IRS Summons and the Duty
of Confidentiality- A Hobson's Choice for Bankers, 89 BANKING L.J. 979 (1972).
69. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1587, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19701 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4411.
70. During eight years as a prosecutor in New York City, the author had subpoenas
issued for long distance toll records on several occasions, only to learn that some telephone
companies regularly destroy their records of subscribers' calls after a specified period.
71. Both the legislative history and the regulations of the Bank Secrecy Act provide that
the government can obtain access to a depositor's records only pursuant to "existing legal
process." See California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. at 52. In Miller, the Court ruled
that a grand jury subpoena duces tecum issued by a federal prosecutor and served upon the
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vealed the information sought pursuant to nothing more than an informal
police request.72
Finally, when the bank depositor writes a check, fills out a deposit slip,
or transacts other business, records of such transactions are regularly made
and kept by the bank. 73  The depositor is reminded of this fact by each
monthly statement. Thus, a depositor is aware that records exist and that
it is possible for others to gain access to those records.
74
In contrast, since a monthly telephone statement does not include a list-
ing of local telephone calls, the subscriber might reasonably conclude that
no such record exists. Such a conclusion is not only logical but, in the
ordinary course of events, factually correct. 75 In fact, the Smith Court ac-
knowledged that telephone companies usually maintain records only of
long distance calls and that the company would not have kept a record of
banks at which Miller maintained accounts was adequate legal process under the Act. 425
U.S. at 446.
The facts in Miller, however, suggest that the protections afforded by the Act's legal proc-
ess requirement may be illusory. Miller was not notified that his records had been subpoe-
naed and thus had no opportunity to move to quash the subpoena prior to disclosure of his
records. The subpoena had been made returnable for a date on which no grand jury was
sitting. Moreover, instead of producing the records before the grand jury, the banks permit-
ted a federal agent to examine microfilms of Miller's checks and deposit slips and repro-
duced copies of the specific checks and deposit slips the agent requested. 425 U.S. at 438.
The Court, however, deemed the failure of the government and the bank to notify Miller as
well as the alleged defects in the subpoena, to be irrelevant. Id at 440. Congress might
better have balanced the needs of law enforcement and protection of privacy if the statute
had required a prosecutor subpoenaing records to notify the depositor, thereby affording the
latter an opportunity to move to quash the subpoena or limit its scope. Additionally, the
statute might have provided for a subpoena without notice to the depositor if the prosecutor
were able to convince an appropriate judge that there was a legitimate need for the records
and that notice would jeopardize an ongoing investigation.
72. 99 S. Ct. at 2578.
73. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 436, 442-43. See note 68 supra.
74. In this respect, Miller is consistent with Lopez, Hoffa, Couch, and White. See note
63 supra. When a person reveals information to another, he is aware that the one in whom
he confides might be or might become a government agent who will disclose such informa-
tion to the authorities. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). Similarly, no
additional fourth amendment issue arises if the other participant to a conversation is in fact
a government agent who records or transmits the disclosure, thereby rendering the informa-
tion less vulnerable to challenges based upon the agent's memory or credibility. See, e.g.,
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
Furthermore, a taxpayer who gives financial information to an accountant is aware that the
accountant will have to reveal much of the information to federal and state tax agencies.
See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). Thus, in each situation, the person
making a disclosure is actually aware that he is conveying information and can reasonably
be held to have "assumed the risk" that such information will be revealed to governmental
authorities.
75. The Court in Smith conceded this fact but held it to be of no consequence. See
notes 60-61 and accompanying text supra.
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Smith's local calls but for the request by the police.76 Nevertheless, the
Court deemed this insufficient to create a valid expectation of privacy con-
cerning the local numbers Smith dialed from his home telephone. Smith
assumed the risk that the telephone company would make a record of local
as well as long distance numbers and reveal that information to the police.
According to the majority, its acceptance of the local-long distance distinc-
tion as constitutionally significant would "make a crazy quilt of the Fourth
Amendment, especially in circumstances where (as here) the pattern of
protection would be dictated by billing practices of a private corpora-
tion."7 7 Thus, in the absence of a "legitimate" expectation of privacy, the
installation and use of a pen register is not a search within the meaning of
the fourth amendment, and therefore no search warrant is required.78
The reasoning adopted by the Court in Smith is troubling in several
respects. In rejecting the local/long distance distinction, the Court applied
an "assumption of risk" analysis to privacy expectations under circum-
stances significantly different from those in previous assumption of risk
cases. Absent the request of the police to the telephone company, informa-
tion concerning Smith's local calls, for all practical purposes, probably
never would have existed.79 Thus, the state not only obtained but, in a real
sense, created evidence. In this respect, Smith is factually different from
the prior assumption of risk cases cited by the Court.8" It is one thing to
hold that the fourth amendment does not shield an individual from the
risk that information freely conveyed to others might be disclosed to gov-
ernmental authorities. It is something else again to hold that a person "as-
sumes the risk" that the government will cause evidence to be created from
one's home telephone without any constitutional safeguards or restric-
tions.8 '
76. As noted earlier, the state apparently did not attempt to show that the telephone
company would have installed a pen register if the request had come from the victim rather
than the police. Had the company installed the register on its own initiative or its cus-
tomer's, no state action would have been involved, and the fourth amendment would be
inapplicable. See notes 7, 9 supra. Thus, an alternative approach to the facts in Smith is
suggested: the state could have attempted to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
the telephone company, provided with the same information, would have used the pen regis-
ter even if not asked to do so by the police. Had the state made such a showing or had the
Court remanded for consideration of this issue, it might not have been necessary for the
Court to have decided the constitutional privacy question.
77. 99 S. Ct. at 2583.
78. Id
79. Although this was not factually established at trial, the Court proceeded on the
assumption that such was the case. See note 53 supra.
80. See notes 63-76 and accompanying text supra.
81. This is not to suggest that a fourth amendment search occurs whenever the state
persuades a private individual to collect information for the police. For example, a police
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Even more disturbing is the Smith Court's casual application of the "as-
sumption of risk" doctrine to privacy expectations. Technology has devel-
oped to the point that virtually any activity, however private or guarded,
may be vulnerable to surreptitious surveillance.8 2 Surely, mere public rec-
ognition of this unhappy fact does not constitutionally require persons to
assume all risks and forfeit all reasonable and legitimate expectations of
privacy from governmental surveillance.83
In determining the scope of fourth amendment protections, it is not
enough simply to recite the risks as did the Smith majority; it is also neces-
sary to determine whether such risks should be constitutionally recognized
as limitations on individual privacy rights.84 Justice Marshall, dissenting
officer might ask a building doorman to write down the comings and goings of a particular
resident. Unlike the use of a pen register in Smith, the doorman's compliance with the
request does not "create" information. The police request simply assures the accurate reten-
tion of facts the doorman would have otherwise perceived. In contrast, but for the police's
request in Smith, no human being (other than Smith) would ever have known the numbers
dialed from Smith's home telephone.
82. A nontechnological analogy may prove instructive. Several courts have held that
when a suspect occupying a hotel room converses at a volume loud enough to be overheard
by investigators who are (not coincidentally) located in an adjoining room, no unlawful
search or seizure of the suspect's words has occurred and testimony concerning what was
overheard is admissible at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Sin Nagh Fong, 490 F.2d 527 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 916 (1974); United States v. Ortega, 471 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948 (1973); Satterfield v. State, 127 Ga. App. 528, 194 S.E.2d. 295
(1972). In United States v. Mallah, 503 F.2d 971, 975-76 (2d Cir. 1974), cer. denied, 420
U.S. 995 (1975), and United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1344 n.31 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975) (appeals arising out of the same investigation in which the au-
thor participated), narcotics suspects' conversations, conducted on a public sidewalk, were
overheard by a police officer hidden in the trunk of a car parked nearby. The court held in
each case that the defendants lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy on the sidewalk.
See generally C. FISHMAN, supra note 11, at 43-44.
83. Professor Amsterdam suggests that an intrusive government might not only exploit
but actually initiate developments diminishing societal privacy expectations. For example,
law enforcement officials might simply announce that, henceforth, they will randomly moni-
tor the contents of first-class mail or private telephone conversations. Once the public has
been put on notice of the risks they "assume" in such communications, under a strict appli-
cation of the "assumption of risk" approach, privacy expectations respecting such communi-
cations would no longer be justified. See Amsterdam, supra note 38, at 349, 384, 407 (cited
in Smith v. Maryland, 99 S. Ct. at 2585 (Marshall, J., dissenting)). Cf Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979) (without reasonable, articulable suspicion of motor vehicle violation,
random police detention and search for driver's license violates fourth amendment).
84. When a person sends a telegram, he necessarily divulges the contents of his message
to the Western Union clerk and presumably is aware that the clerk might disclose the
message to others. When a person places a telephone call through a switchboard operator,
he is aware that the operator might listen in and reveal what was said. When a person uses a
party-line telephone or a telephone that has an extension in another room, he is aware that
someone might be listening in and might disclose the conversation. In a factual sense, there-
fore, the individual "assumes the risk" that the government, in anticipation of the telegram
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in Smith, set forth the appropriate inquiry: "whether privacy expectations
are legitimate within the meaning of Katz depends not on the risks an
individual can be presumed to accept when imparting information to third
parties, but on the risks he should be forced to assume in a free and open
society."85 The Smith majority gave passing recognition to this basic ques-
tion, acknowledging that under some circumstances "a normative inquiry
would be proper."86 The majority, however, did not engage in such an
or phone call, might ask the clerk, or the operator, or a person with access to the party line or
extension phone, to report the contents of the message or to listen in and disclose the con-
tents of the conversation. Similarly, when a person rents a hotel room he can be said to have
"assumed the risk" that the hotel management might have bugged the room at the request of
the police. Clearly, however, such surveillance would constitute a search subject to the
fourth amendment.
85. 99 S. Ct. at 2585 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Although I agree with Justice Marshall
that value judgments and not merely assessment of risks must be made, I disagree with his
conclusions in a number of cases. In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), Justice
Marshall asserted that the fourth amendment requires a search warrant before an informer
may transmit or record his conversation with a criminal suspect. Id at 795-96 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Since no warrant is required to authorize the informer's encounter with a sus-
pect, there is no constitutional reason why a warrant should be required before the informer
may record or transmit what he would in any event hear. Further, the imposition of a
warrant requirement in this situation would often impose undue burdens on already limited
law enforcement resources. See C. FISHMAN, supra note 11, at 93-98. Similarly, Justice
Marshall dissented in California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), which upheld
the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act. See note 68 supra. Justice Marshall argued
that to require an unwilling bank to preserve records that otherwise would have been de-
stroyed, in effect, required the bank to collect evidence. He saw this as the constitutional
equivalent of forcing a private citizen to make an illegal entry onto a premises and to photo-
copy documents kept there. Thus, the mandated preservation of a depositor's records con-
stituted an illegal governmental "seizure." Further, Justice Marshall argued that the
government's use of existing legal process to obtain the records would provide the depositor
with no protection. He predicted that the Court would hold that the depositor lacked stand-
ing to contest a bank's compliance with a subpoena for the records. 416 U.S. at 94-97 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). This prediction was confirmed in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976). Although Congress might have struck a better balance between the government's
legitimate need for the records and the depositor's right to privacy, see note 71 supra, Justice
Marshall's categorization of the statute as the equivalent of an illegal seizure is unwarranted.
Virtually all of the information covered by the Bank Secrecy Act is information that the
bank would have made a record of in any event. Requiring a bank to preserve those records
is not a seizure. The seizure occurs only when the bank, complying with a subpoena, deliv-
ers the records to the government. In this respect, the Act does not violate the fourth amend-
ment.
86. The majority stated:
Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz' two-pronged inquiry
would provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment protection. For exam-
ple, if the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that
all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter
might not in fact entertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding their homes,
papers, and effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country, unaware of
this Nation's traditions, erroneously assumed that police were continuously moni-
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inquiry, explain why it did not, or indicate when such an inquiry would be
appropriate or necessary.
Smith v. Maryland was an appropriate case for just such an inquiry.
"Implicit in the concept of assumption of risk is some notion of choice. ' 8 7
The telephone has assumed a vital role in private communications.88 Yet,
much of that privacy is stripped away if an individual must "assume the
risk" of pen register surveillance each time he dials his telephone. Indeed,
it is absurd to speak in terms of assumed risks "where, as a practical mat-
ter, individuals have no realistic alternative."89 Persons whose conduct in-
volves no criminality may wish to avoid disclosure of their personal or
professional contacts. For example, persons who quietly support unpopu-
lar causes or journalists wishing to preserve the confidentiality of their
sources might fall into this catagory.9 ° More fundamentally, it is simply
"nobody's business" whom a person contacts by telephone unless a judi-
cial officer is satisfied that the government has a valid basis for seeking to
know.9'
Imposition of a search warrant requirement before law enforcement offi-
cials may seek telephone company cooperation in the use of a pen register
would limit such privacy intrusions to those situations in which the need
and basis for the intrusion are adequately demonstrated. The matter
seems an appropriate subject for legislative correction.
IV. STATUTORY REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
Congress has enacted two statutes regulating governmental use of elec-
toring his telephone conversations, a subjective expectation of privacy regarding
the contents of his calls might be lacking as well. In such circumstances, where an
individual's subjective expectations had been "conditioned" by influences alien to
well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obvi-
ously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection was. In determining whether a "legitimate expectation of
privacy" existed in such cases, a normative inquiry would be proper.
99 S. Ct. at 2580 n.5.
87. Id at 2585 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. See id at 2583 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
89. Id at 2585 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90. See id at 2586 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958)); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 695 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
91. It can, of course, be argued that this principle applies to long distance toll records as
well as to pen register surveillance of local calls. However, in contrast with the situation in
Smith, the telephone company regularly keeps long distance toll call records for business
purposes and subscribers are aware that such records might be available to the government.
Thus, the "assumption of risk" theory, combined with the legitimate investigatory needs of
prosecutors and grand juries, provide sufficient justification to permit governmental access
to such records by request or subpoena without prior judicial scrutiny.
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tronic surveillance: Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 (Title 111)9' and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 (FISA).93 An examination of these two statutes indicates that
Congress acted with the intent and the expectation that all surveillance,
including that by pen register, would require authorization by court order.
The result in Smith ignores this congressional expectation and therefore
nullifies congressional intent. In addition, the Smith decision has intro-
duced an absurd anomaly into federal law.
A. Title III
Title III governs wiretapping and bugging by law enforcement offi-
cials.9 4 Its enactment marked Congress' first affirmative expression re-
garding both the constitutionality95 and propriety 96 of electronic
surveillance.97 Under Title III, before "intercepting" 98 either "wire com-
munications" 99 or "oral communications,"' 00 law enforcement officials
92. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976), as amended by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783.
93. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (Supp. 11 1978).
94. See generaly C. FISHMAN, supra note 1i; Note, Electronic Intelligence Gathering and
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 331 (1975);
Note, Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance - Title III of the Crime Control Act of 1968,
23 RUTGERS L. REV. 319 (1969).
95. Title III was adopted partly to comply with the Supreme Court's decisions in Berger
v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In both
cases, the Court held that eavesdropping was a search and seizure subject to the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement. In Berger, the Court set forth fairly specific constitu-
tional guidelines. 388 U.S. at 54-60. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2161-62; C. FISHMAN, supra note 11, at 6-8;
Note, Electronic Surveillance, Title 11I, and the Requirement of Necessity, 2 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 571, 574-86 (1975). See also Note, Electronic Surveillance After Berger, 5 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 107 (1968).
96. Debate over the propriety of electronic surveillance has generated a large volume of
scholarly commentary. See, e.g., S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVES-
DROPPERS (1959); E. LAPIDUS, EAVESDROPPING ON TRIAL (1974); H. SCHWARTZ, TAPS,
BUGS AND FOOLING THE PEOPLE (1977); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Don-
nelly, Comments and Caveats on the Wiretapping Controversy, 63 YALE L.J. 799 (1954); Rog-
ers, The Casefor Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792 (1954); Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance By
Leave of the Magistrate The Case in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (1969).
97. Prior to the enactment of Title III, the primary statutory restraint on the use of
electronic surveillance in federal criminal investigations was § 605 of the Federal Communi-
cations Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1976)). Its terms were prohibitory in nature, providing that "no person" could reveal the
existence or content of a communication except under certain limited circumstances. See
generally Note, supra note 4, at 1030-42.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1976).
99. Id § 25 10(1).
100. Id § 2510(2).
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must obtain a special eavesdropping order.'"' The requirements for such a
warrant are considerably more stringent than those governing ordinary
search warrants. 102 Title III directly regulates all federal law enforcement
use of wiretapping and bugging 0 3 and authorizes the states to enact simi-
lar legislation respecting wiretapping and bugging by state officials, pro-
vided that the state legislation is at least as restrictive as Title III. 1 4
101. Surveillance outside the scope of these statutory definitions may be conducted with-
out regard to Title III's requirements. Additionally, an "oral communication" is protected
from nonorder interception only if it is uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation of
privacy "under circumstances justifying such expectation." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1976). See
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 90, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2112, 2178. In contrast, "wire communications" are protected from noncourt authorized
surveillance regardless of whether the participants have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1976). Thus, even though persons communicating by telegram or
party-line telephone are aware that their privacy is vulnerable to telegraph company em-
ployees or other party-line subscribers, law enforcement officials must obtain a Title III
order before surveillance can be commenced. However, pen register surveillance was ex-
pressly excluded from the statutory definition of "intercept." See note 107 infra.
There are two other significant exceptions to Title III's court order requirement. First, no
order is required to authorize interception if a party to the conversation himself records or
transmits it or gives prior permission for others to do so. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c), (d) (1976).
Second, communications common carriers are authorized to intercept communications for
valid business purposes. Id § 251 l(2)(a)(i). See notes 4-6 and accompanying text supra.
102. Only certain serious crimes may be investigated by electronic surveillance, 18
U.S.C. § 2516(1), (2) (1976), and Title III sets forth exacting requirements. The Title III
application and order must identify the persons (if known) whose communications are to be
intercepted, id § 2518(l)(b)(iv), (4)(a), must specify the facilities or location subject to sur-
veillance, id § 2518(l)(b)(ii), (4)(b), and must specify the offense and describe the communi-
cations sought. Id § 2518(l)(b)(i), (iii), (4)(c). Moreover, there must be probable cause to
believe that evidence of the specified crimes will be obtained through such interceptions. Id
§ 2518(3)(a), (b), (d). The application must also demonstrate that ordinary investigative
procedures have not been and will not be adequate to accomplish the goals of the surveil-
lance. Id § 2518(l)(c), (3)(c). Warrants must be of limited duration with a maximum of 30
days, id § 2518(4)(e), (5), and interceptions must terminate when the authorized objective
has been attained. Id § 2518(5).
Importantly, surveillance must be conducted so as to "minimize" the interception of com-
munications unrelated to the purposes of the surveillance. Id § 2518(5). See generally Fish-
man, The "'Minimization Requirement" in Electronic Surveillance. Title 1I, The Fourth
Amendment, and the Dread Scott Decision, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 315 (1979); 28 CATH. U.L.
REV. 143 (1978). Title III also regulates how recordings of interceptions are to be main-
tained, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1976); restricts the disclosure and use of intercepted commu-
nications and derivative evidence, id § 2517; and specifies how, when, and to whom notice
of interception is to be served. fd § 2518(8)(d), (9). In addition, Title III contains an exclu-
sionary rule, id § 2515, and specifies grounds for suppression of intercepted communica-
tions. Id § 2518(1 0)(a). See generally C. FISHMAN, supra note 11.
103. On the federal level, applications for eavesdropping orders must be authorized by
the Attorney General or a specially designated assistant attorney general. 18 U.S.C. §
2516(1) (1976). State applications must be authorized by the principal prosecuting attorney
of a state or political subdivision. Id § 2516(2).
104. See note 44 supra.
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Additionally, surveillance conducted in violation of Title III may give rise
to criminal penalties,"°5 and Title III created a civil cause of action for
persons whose privacy rights are violated by unlawful surveillance.
0 6
Title III's legislative history indicates clearly that pen register surveil-
lance does not constitute "interception" of a "wire communication" within
the meaning of the statute.'0 7  Thus, law enforcement officials need not
105. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1976).
106. Id § 2520. This section also provides that "A good faith reliance on a court order
or legislative authorization shall constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal action
brought under this chapter or any other law." Id
107. [18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1976)] defines "intercept" to include the aural acquisi-
tion of the contents of any wire or oral communication by any electronic, mechani-
cal, or other device. Other forms of surveillance are not within the proposed
legislation. An examination of telephone company records by law enforcement
agents in the regular course of their duties would be lawful because it would not be
an "interception." The proposed legislation is not designed to prevent the tracing
of phone calls. The use of a "pen register," for example, would be permissible.
But see United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966). The proposed legisla-
tion is intended to protect the privacy of the communication itself and not the
means of communication.
S. REP. No. 1079, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 90, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2112, 2178 (some citations omitted).
The reference to Dote and the use of the signal "but see" are somewhat confusing. In
Dote, a telephone company acting at government request installed a pen register on a tele-
phone located in a gambling "wireroom." The register revealed that calls were being placed
to the defendants' telephones, and the government used this information to obtain evidence
leading to the defendants' indictment for gambling offenses. The issue in Dote was whether
use of the pen register constituted an "interception or divulgence" of a wire communication
in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934). The government argued that the telephone company
was the "intended recipient" of the electronic signals created when the wireroom phone was
dialed, and that no "interception" occurs when the recipient of a wire communication dis-
closes its content. The Seventh Circuit categorized this argument, which is difficult to distin-
guish from the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court in Smith, as a "play on words"
which had only "minimal plausibility." 371 F.2d at 180. Since human intervention was not
required to connect the wireroom telephone to the numbers that were dialed, the court rea-
soned it was specious to contend that anyone other than someone at the called telephone was
the intended recipient. Further, since the government for all practical purposes knew what
types of messages were being sent over the wireroom telephone, use of the pen register re-
vealed the contents of the calls, thereby violating both the sender's and the recipients' (de-
fendants') statutorily protected rights. Id. Finally, the court noted that its decision did not
render telephone company use of pen registers for legitimate business purposes unlawful so
long as the company had the consent of the individual on whose phone the device was used.
Id at 181.
Although some may find the logic of the Dote decision persuasive, neither its holding nor
its dictum survived the enactment of Title III. Title III deleted wire communications from
the purview of § 605 of the Federal Communications Act, the statute applied in Dote. See
47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934), as amendedby Pub. L. No. 90-35 1, § 803, 82 Stat. 223 (1968) (current
version at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976)). Further, Title III specifically excludes all normal tele-
phone company practices (including use of pen registers) from the restrictions and prohibi-
tions of Title III. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (1976). See note 6 supra. Thus, Title III has
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obtain a Title III order before employing a pen register."' Both Title III
and its legislative history are silent, however, as to whether Congress in
1968 thought it necessary under the fourth amendment for law enforce-
ment officials to obtain a standard search warrant before requesting a tele-
phone company to install a pen register for investigative purposes.'1 9
B. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
The second federal statute regulating electronic surveillance is the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.110 This Act governs the use of
"electronic surveillance""' within the United States' 12 by national secur-
ity officials to acquire "foreign intelligence information.""' 3 Of particular
effectively rendered Dote moot. See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 168
n.13 (1977).
108. See generally Note, Circum venting Title III: The Use of Pen Register Surveillance in
Law Enforcement, 1977 DUKE L.J. 751.
109. Amendments to Title III enacted as part of FISA and indicative of congressional
intent in 1978 are discussed in text accompanying notes 124-43 infra.
110. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (Supp. 11 1978). For discussions of foreign intelligence elec-
tronic surveillance and the congressional debate surrounding the passage of FISA, see Sha-
piro, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Legislative Balancing of National Security and
the Fourth Amendment, 15 HARV. J. LEGIS. 119 (1978); Note, The Fourth Amendment and
Executive Authorization of Warrantless Foreign Security Surveillance, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q.
397. See also Lacovara, Presidential Power to Gather Intelligence. The Tension Between Arti-
cle II and Amendment IV, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 106 (Nov. 3, 1976); Note, Foreign
Security Surveillance - Balancing Executive Power and the Fourth Amendment, 45 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1179 (1977).
111. FISA's definition of "electronic surveillance" incorporates all forms of surveillance
governed by Title III as well as several types not regulated by Title III, including the use of a
pen register. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (Supp. 11 1978). See notes 98-103 and accompanying text
supra.
112. FISA does not apply to surveillance of communications having no geographical
nexus to the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (Supp. 11 1978). See S. REP. No. 701, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 34-35, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3973, 4003-04
(Intelligence Committee); H.R. REP. No. 1283, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1978) (Select
Intelligence Committee). See generally C. FISHMAN, supra note 11, § 353 (Supp. 1979).
113. Only federal, not state, officials may conduct FISA surveillance. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802,
1804 (Supp. 11 1978). "Foreign intelligence information" is information relating to the na-
tion's ability to protect against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts, sabotage, inter-
national terrorism, and clandestine intelligence activities of foreign agents within the United
States, information relating to national defense and security, and information relating to the
conduct of foreign affairs, id § 1801(e). Activities protected by the first amendment, how-
ever, cannot constitute foreign intelligence information. Id § 1805(a)(3)(A).
FISA permits surveillance under circumstances prohibited by Title III. For example,
FISA authorizes surveillance when there is no probable cause to believe that criminal activ-
ity is involved so long as there is probable cause to believe that foreign intelligence informa-
tion will be obtained and other enumerated circumstances exist. Id §§ 1801(e), 1802. See
S. REP. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-12, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3973, 3979-80 (Intelligence Committee). See generally 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a) (Supp. II
1978); C. FISHMAN, supra note 11, §§ 353, 359-365 (Supp. 1979). In other respects, however,
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importance here is that FISA requires the issuance of an order before na-
tional security officials may conduct "electronic surveillance" to acquire
the "contents"'' 4 of a "wire communication."" I 5
The legislative history of FISA's definitions demonstrates that a pen reg-
ister acquires the "contents" of a "wire communication." Commenting on
FISA's definition of "contents," the House Select Intelligence Committee
observed that such definition
is meant to assure that the scope of the bill is sufficient to protect
legitimate privacy interests. Inasmuch as three of the four defini-
tions of electronic surveillance, which in fact define the coverage
of [FISA], turn on the acquisition of "contents," it is necessary to
assure that devices such aspen registers are included."6
FISA is more restrictive than Title III. For example, FISA's restrictions concerning the
retention and dissemination of information obtained from electronic surveillance are more
rigid. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(l)(h), 1802(a)(1), 1804(a)(5), 1805(a)(5), (b)(1)(F) (Supp. 11 1978).
See generally C. FISHMAN, supra note 11, § 368 (Supp. 1979).
114. "Contents" is defined as "any information concerning the identity of the parties to
[a] communication or the existence, substance, purport, or meaning of that communication."
50 U.S.C. § 1801(n) (Supp. 11 1978).
115. The FISA order requirement is set forth in id § 1805; exceptions to the order re-
quirement, not germane to this article, are set forth at id §§ 1802(a), 1805(f), 1811. Emer-
gency surveillance is permitted for up to 24 hours prior to the issuance of an order. Id §
1805(e). FISA's procedures are "the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as
defined in [50 U.S.C. § 1801(o] . . . may be conducted." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (Supp. II
1978). See S. REP. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 71, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3973, 4040-41; H.R. REP. No. 1283, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 100-01 (1978); H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 1720, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4048, 4068.
116. H.R. REP. No. 1283, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1978) (emphasis supplied). The FISA
definition of "contents" is identical to that contained in Title III, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (1976).
In United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), the Supreme Court held that
use of a pen register does not constitute an "interception" under Title III because a pen
register does not acquire the "contents" of a "wire communication" as those terms are de-
fined in Title I1. Id at 166-67. The House Select Intelligence Committee labeled this latter
analysis "gratuitous" in light of the exclusion of pen registers from Title III's definition of
"intercept." H.R. REP. No. 1283, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 n.33 (1978). The Committee em-
phasized:
It is the intent of this committee that pen registers do acquire "contents" of "wire
communications" as those terms are defined in [FISA]. The term "contents" spe-
cifically mentions the identity of parties and "identity" includes a person's phone
number, which can as effectively identify him as the mention of his name. More-
over, the definition of "contents" includes information concerning the "existence"
of a communication. When a person dials another's telephone number, whether or
not the other person answers the phone, this is a communication under this bill.
This is especially true in the intelligence field where signals to a spy may be con-
veyed merely by having the phone ring a designated number of times. The fact
that the target of the pen registers has attempted to communicate with another
person at a particular phone is information concerning the "existence" of the com-
munication.
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Since under FISA a pen register acquires the "contents" of a "wire com-
munication,"' 1 7 use of a pen register constitutes "electronic surveil-
lance."" 8 Thus, national security officials must first obtain a court order
before conducting pen register surveillance.' Moreover, FISA's legisla-
Id.
There is no corresponding discussion in the reports of the Senate Judiciary and Intelli-
gence Committees because S. 1566, the Senate draft of FISA, incorporated Title III's defini-
tion of "contents." See S. REP. No. 604, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (Judiciary Committee),
reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3904, 3920; S. REP. No. 701, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 16 (Intelligence Committee), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3973, 3985. The Conference Committee adopted the House approach, including a definition
of "contents" in FISA rather than incorporating by reference the (identical) definition con-
tained in Title III, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1720, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in [1978]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4052.
117. The House Intelligence Committee discussion of "wire communications" contains a
specific reference to pen registers. See H.R. REP. No. 1283, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1978).
The Senate draft of FISA, S. 1566, contained no definition of the term, instead incorporating
the Title III definition. See S. REP. No. 604, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3904, 3920; S. REP. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprintedin
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3973, 3985. The Conference Committee adopted the House
definition, which varied from the Title III definition in certain technical aspects not relevant
to pen registers. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1720, 95TH CONG., 2d SESs. 22-23, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4048, 4051-52.
118. The separate reports prepared by the House Select Committee on Intelligence and
the Senate Intelligence Committee both contain the following definitional discussions of
"electronic surveillance" respecting wire communications:
The surveillance covered by [50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(2) (Supp. 11 1978)] is not lim-
ited to the acquisition of the oral, or verbal contents of a wire communication. It
includes the acquisition of any other contents of the communication, for example,
where computerized data is transmitted by wire. Therefore, it includes any form of
"pen register" or "touch-tone decoder" device which is used to acquire, from the
contents of a wire communication, the identities or locations of the parties to the
communication. Examination of telephone billing records in documentary form is
not covered. The committee is concerned about the need to protect that privacy of
such confidential records of the provision of telecommunications services, but does
not believe that [FISA] is the appropriate measure in which to do so.
S. REP. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3973, 4004-05; H.R. REP. No. 1283, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1978). This language
could be interpreted as including the use of pen registers within the definition of "electronic
surveillance" only when the register is used in conjunction with surveillance acquiring what
is actually said during a telephone conversation. However, any ambiguity in this regard is
resolved by FISA's definition of "contents" and that term's legislative history. See notes
114-16 and accompanying text supra.
119. If probable cause exists that pen register surveillance will reveal evidence of specific
crimes, national security officials could choose between a FISA order and an ordinary
search warrant to authorize the surveillance. FISA's procedures apply only when such offi-
cials either cannot or choose not to employ other legal surveillance options. A FISA order is
far more difficult to obtain than a normal search warrant, and FISA imposes restrictions on
the retention, use, and disclosure of the information obtained that are far more restrictive
than statutes governing other types of warrants. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804-1806 (Supp. 11 1978);
C. FISHMAN, supra note 11, §§ 359-370 (Supp. 1979). Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 41, gov-
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tive history mandates the imposition of a court order requirement whether
national security officials use a pen register with the consent, over the ob-
jection, or with the knowledge of the telephone company. 2 '
V. SMITH V MARYLAND AND THE NULLIFICATION OF
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
The Court in Smith refused to attach constitutional significance to the
distinction between long distance calls, records of which are regularly kept
by the telephone company, and local calls, records of which are normally
nonexistent. Recognition of this distinction, the Court reasoned, would
"make a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment. ... .2 Ironically, it is
the Smith decision that makes a crazy quilt of federal law regarding pen
registers. It is incongruous' that national security officials must obtain a
special surveillance warrant before using a pen register to investigate
threats to national security 122 while a local police officer with the informal
cooperation of the telephone company may, without any sort of court or-
der, employ a pen register for any reason at all.
This result is contrary to what Congress intended. When FISA was en-
acted, Congress proceeded with the understanding that a search warrant or
other court order is generally required to authorize law enforcement use of
erning search warrants, with 18 U.S.C. §§ 2517, 2518 (1976). Nevertheless, for several rea-
sons, national security officials are likely to rely almost exclusively on the procedures
mandated in FISA. FISA authorizes issuance of an order authorizing electronic surveil-
lance even where no criminal conduct is suspected so long as there is probable cause to
believe that "foreign intelligence information" will be obtained. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A)-
(B) (Supp. 11 1978). See C. FISHMAN, supra note 1I, §§ 359-365 (Supp. 1979). Moreover, a
FISA order may authorize surveillance for up to one year, depending upon the identity of
the target. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(d)(1) (Supp. 11 1978). See C. FISHMAN, supra note I, §§ 363-
365 (Supp. 1979). Unless the government decides to use FISA-obtained evidence in a crimi-
nal proceeding against someone aggrieved by FISA surveillance, the government need never
disclose the occurrence of such surveillance. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c)-(f) (Supp. 11 1978). See C.
FISHMAN, supra note 11, §§ 371-372 (Supp. 1979). Because of these procedural advantages
and enhanced confidentiality, national security officials probably will prefer a FISA order
even if the grounds for a regular search warrant exist.
120. FISA authorizes a telephone company to cooperate with national security officials
in the conduct of electronic surveillance only if such cooperation is directed by court order
(or by certificaton of the Attorney General that no warrant or court order is required by law,
an exception not relevant to pen registers). Further, a telephone company is liable for civil
damages if it cooperates with national security officials without being directed to do so by
court order. See Pub. L. No. 95-551, § 201(a), 92 Stat. 1796-97 (1978), amending 18 U.S.C. §
2511(2)(a)(ii) (1976). The implications of this provision are discussed in notes 143-49 and
accompanying text infra.
121. 99 S. Ct. at 2582-83. See notes 76-81 and accompanying text supra.
122. See notes 110-20 and accompanying text supra.
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pen registers.1 3 This is demonstrated by FISA's criminal and civil liabil-
ity provisions and by the conforming amendments to Title III, enacted as
part of FISA.124 Furthermore, there is strong circumstantial evidence that
Congress also assumed that all law enforcement use of pen registers was
subject to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement, even if the sur-
veillance was conducted by the telephone company at the request of the
police. This evidence will be developed by examining a substantive
amendment to Title III enacted in FISA, which regulates telephone com-
pany cooperation with official wiretapping.
25
Before examining FISA's civil and criminal liability provisions and its
amendments to Title III, a preliminary comment is in order. In these stat-
utory provisions and in the congressional reports discussing them, the
phrase "search warrant or court order" appears several times. Yet, no-
where did Congress specify what type of court order, other than a search
warrant, was contemplated. This lack of specificity has assumed a perhaps
unintended significance in light of Smith.
126
A. Pen Register Surveillance in General
1. FISA "s Civil and Criminal Liability Provisions
FISA imposes civil and criminal liability on any person who "engages in
electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute"
or knowingly discloses or uses information obtained through illegal elec-
tronic surveillance. 2 7 It is a defense to both criminal prosecution and civil
liability, however, "that the defendant was a law enforcement or investiga-
tive officer engaged in the course of his official duties and the electronic
surveillance was authorized by and conducted pursuant to a search war-
123. This understanding is undisturbed by Smith, for the Court held only that a warrant
is unnecessary if the surveillance is conducted by a telephone company at police request.
Had the police employed the pen register themselves, without telephone company involve-
ment, this would have constituted an illegal search and seizure. See text accompanying note
64 supra.
124. See notes 127-33 and accompanying text infra.
125. See notes 134-43 and accompanying text infra.
126. See notes 168-83 and accompanying text infra.
127. 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a) (Supp. 11 1978) (criminal liability); id § 1810 (civil liability)
(Supp. 11 1978). These provisions are similar to Title II's. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(l) (criminal
penalties), 2520 (civil liability) (1976). The conference committee that reconciled the House
and Senate drafts of FISA "agree[d] that the criminal penalties for intelligence agents under
[FISA] should be essentially the same as for law enforcement officers under [Title III]" and
that "the civil liability of intelligence agents under [FISA] should coincide with the criminal
liability." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1720, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4048, 4062-63.
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rant or court order of a court of competent jurisdiction."' 128 Commenting
on these provisions, the House Select Intelligence Committee noted:
Since certain technical activities - such as the use of apen regis-
ter - fall within the definition of electronic surveillance under
[FISA], but not within the definition of [interception of] wire or
oral communications under [Title III], [FISA] provides an affirm-
ative defense to a law enforcement or investigative officer who
engages in such activity for law enforcement purposes in the
course of his official duties, pursuant to a search warrant or court
order. 1
2 9
Thus, federal agents - law enforcement officials as well as national secur-
ity officials - who use a pen register without a search warrant or court
order are subject to FISA's civil and criminal provisions. 130  Congress
128. 50 U.S.C. § 1809(b) (Supp. 11 1978). The possible significance of the phrase "court
of competent jurisdiction" is discussed at notes 160-62 and accompanying text infra.
129. H.R. REP. No. 1283, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1978) (commenting on 50 U.S.C. §
1809(b) (Supp. 11 1978), the good faith defense provision) (emphasis supplied). At the end
of the quoted passage, the report cites United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159,
165-68 (1977), in which the Court held that a court order issued pursuant to rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs the issuance and execution of search
warrants, sufficed to authorize the use of a pen register and to compel a telephone company
to provide the government with assistance.
The Senate Intelligence and Judiciary Committees' reports on S. 1566, the Senate version
of FISA, contain a perplexing ambiguity. Each report comments that FISA does not apply
to the use of pen registers for law enforcement purposes and then, in identical language,
continues: "In such cases criminal penalties will not attach simply because the Government
fails to follow the procedures in [FISA] (such penalties may, of course, attach if the surveil-
lance is commenced without a search warrant or in violation of a court order)." S. REP. No.
701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4037; S.
REP. No. 604, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3963 (emphasis supplied). The use of the word "may," the primary meaning of which is
"might," is perplexing. Certainly the Senate committees that drafted and favorably reported
S. 1566 must have known whether they intended such surveillance to come within the scope
of their bill's criminal provision. Fortunately, the ambiguity in the Senate reports is of no
consequence because the Conference Committee adopted, with some modification, the
House version of the criminal penalty provision. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1720, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4048, 4062. Since the
House Select Intelligence Committee Report does not contain similar ambiguities, federal
law enforcement officials who conduct pen register surveillance without a warrant or court
order are liable under FISA's criminal provisions.
130. Commenting on nonwarrant pen register surveillance by state officials, the House
Select Intelligence Committee stated: "While such action may be unconstitutional, it is not
made a [federal] crime by [Title III] and should not be by [FISA]." H.R. REP. No. 1283,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1978). This exclusion of state officials from FISA's criminal provi-
sion has assumed a somewhat greater significance than Congress probably intended. Since
the scope of FISA's criminal and civil liability provisions is identical, see note 127 supra,
state officials are also exempt from the latter. By so exempting state officials, Congress has
left a loophole in the overall regulation of pen register surveillance. See notes 146-50 and
accompanying text infra.
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would not have so provided had it not understood that law enforcement
use of pen registers was already subject to the fourth amendment warrant
requirement.
2. The "'Exclusive Means" Pro vision
Several amendments to Title III were enacted as part of FISA."3' One
amendment added a provision to Title III mandating that the "procedures
in [Title III and FISA] shall be the exclusive means by which electronic
surveillance as defined in [50 U.S.C. § 1801], and the interception of do-
mestic wire and oral communications may be. conducted." 3 ' Commenting
on this provision, the House Select Intelligence Committee noted:
[Tihe use of pen registers and similar devices for law enforce-
ment purposes is not covered by [Title III] or [FISA] and new
subsection (f) [of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)] is not intended to prohibit
it. Rather, . . . the "procedures" referred to in subsection (f) in-
clude acquiring a court order for such activity. It is the Commit-
tee's intent that neither this nor any other provision of the
legislation have any effect on the holding in United States v. New
York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), that rule 41 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure empowers federal judges to author-
ize the installation of pen registers for law enforcement pur-
poses. 133
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure regulates the issu-
ance, execution, and litigation of search warrants. Thus, FISA did not
expressly regulate law enforcement use of pen registers because Congress
understood that a search warrant or other court order was already required
to authorize such use.
B. The "Directed Assistance" Provision
A second significant FISA amendment to Title III regulates telephone
131. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, tit. II, 92
Stat. 1796 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (Supp. 11 1978)). Most of these amendments
are technical in nature, designed to assure that the language of Title III reflects the enact-
ment of FISA. Thus, the words "under this chapter," "intercepted under this chapter," and
"intercepted pursuant to this chapter," were added to various sections of Title III. Pub. L.
No. 95-511, § 201(d)-(h), 92 Stat. 1797-98 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518, 2519 (Supp. II
1978)). Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1976), which held Title III inapplicable to wire-
tapping and eavesdropping conducted for national security reasons, was repealed since that
provision had been superseded by FISA. See Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 201(c), 92 Stat. 1797
(1978).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (Supp. 11 1978).
133. H.R. REP. No. 1283, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 n.54 (1978) (Select Intelligence Com-
mittee). The New York Tel. Co. case is discussed at notes 11-14 and accompanying text
supra; notes 175-83 and accompanying text infra.
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company cooperation with governmental surveillance efforts.' 34 This
amendment strongly suggests that Congress acted with the belief that the
fourth amendment required law enforcement officials to obtain a search
warrant before using pen registers even where, as in Smith, the telephone
company voluntarily installed the device at the request of the police.
Prior to FISA, Title III placed no explicit limitations on telephone com-
pany cooperation with law enforcement officials.'35 Rather, the statute
merely provided that it was "not unlawful" under Title III for a communi-
cations common carrier to provide "information, facilities, or technical
assistance" to a law enforcement official who was authorized by a Title III
or equivalent state court order to intercept a wire or oral communica-
tion.136 Cooperation in situations not involving actual interceptions of
communications, including the use of pen registers, 137 was completely un-
regulated.
As amended by FISA, Title III now "authorizes" a communications
common carrier "to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance
to persons authorized by law to intercept wire or oral communications [as
defined in Title III] or to conduct electronic surveillance [as defined in
FISA]" only if the carrier has been provided with "a court order directing
such assistance signed by the authorizing judge" specifying the nature and
duration of the cooperation required.138  Moreover, a violation of this pro-
vision "by a communications common carrier or an officer, employee or
agent thereof, shall render the carrier liable for the civil damages provided
134. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii) (Supp. 11 1978).
135. An implicit limitation is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1976), which imposes
criminal liability for illegal interceptions of communications. Except where specifically pro-
vided in Title III, "any person" who intercepts or who discloses or uses the contents of an
intercepted wire or oral communication, or who endeavors or procures another to do so,
may be punished by a fine and imprisonment. Id Moreover, "any person" who unlawfully
intercepts communications is also subject to civil liability. Id § 2520. The statutory defini-
tion of "person" clearly includes telephone companies. See id § 2510(6). Thus, a telephone
company would be both civilly and criminally liable if it installed a wiretap on someone's
telephone at the request of the police in the absence of a court order. Still, these provisions
do not focus on the unique role a telephone company often plays in official wiretapping and
bugging. Further, they apply only when there has been an "interception." In addition, 18
U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(a)(i) (1976) expressly permits communications common carriers to inter-
cept, disclose, or use wire communications where such interception, disclosure, or use "is a
necessary incident" to the service it provides or is necessary to protect the carrier's rights or
property, and if incriminating evidence is revealed during such interceptions, such evidence
may be disclosed to and used by law enforcement officials. See notes 6-9 and accompanying
text supra.
136. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii) (1976).
137. See notes 107-08 and accompanying text supra.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(a)(ii) (Supp. 11 1978). This provision is discussed further at text
accompanying notes 162-66 infra.
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for in [18 U.S.C.] section 2520."'"9
This amendment does not impose additional duties upon telephone
companies to cooperate with law enforcement officials. 140 To the contrary,
the amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(a)(ii) expressly requires a warrant
or other court order before a telephone company is "authorized" to pro-
vide such assistance.' 4' Since this provision is clearly applicable to pen
register surveillance conducted by national security officials to acquire for-
eign intelligence information, 42 it is inconceivable that Congress would
have at the same time intended to permit a telephone company to install a
pen register at the request of law enforcement officials absent a court order
of any kind. 143  This amendment, therefore, demonstrates that Congress
139. Id 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976) created a civil cause of action permitting recovery of
actual or liquidated damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and litigation costs. How-
ever, a good faith reliance on a court order or legislative authorization constitutes a com-
plete defense to both civil and criminal actions. Id
140. Even prior to the amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(a)(ii) (1976), another section of
Title III authorized a judge to include within a Title III warrant an order directing commu-
nications common carriers, landlords, and the like to furnish "all information, facilities, and
technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively .... ." Id §
2518(4). Thus, FISA's amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii) (1976) did not impose addi-
tional duties of cooperation upon telephone companies because "the nature and scope" of
the assistance provided for by that amendment "is intended to be identical to that which
may be directed under § 2518(4)." S. REP. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 69, reprinted in
f 19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3973, 4038.
141. Before the communications common carrier may provide such information or
assistance, whether under Title III or FISA, the Government agent must furnish the carrier
with an order signed by the court. "The conference substitute adopts ... the Senate provi-
sion imposing civil liability upon a common carrier which provides assistance without a
court order." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1720, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4048, 4064.
There is one exception to the court order requirement. In emergency situations requiring
interception or surveillance before a court order can be obtained, 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(a)(ii)
(Supp. 11 1978) mandates cooperation if the telephone company has received a written certi-
fication from the Attorney General (or, in the case of surveillance by state officials, a state
prosecutor) indicating "that no warrant or court order is required by law, that all statutory
requirements have been met, and that the specified assistance is required." Id If such
emergency surveillance is conducted, the government must obtain an order approving the
surveillance within 24 hours for FISA surveillance, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e) (Supp. 11 1978), or
48 hours for law enforcement surveillance. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1976). A telephone com-
pany is also prohibited from revealing the existence of Title III interceptions or FISA sur-
veillance unless compelled by legal process, and then only after notice to the Attorney
General or state official who obtained the original court order authorizing the surveillance.
18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(a)(ii) (Supp. 11 1978).
142. See notes 114-20 and accompanying text supra.
143. That Congress did not intend such a result is illustrated by the gaping loophole it
would create in FISA. If, for example, an F.B.I. agent assigned to national security matters
wants to use a pen register, he must first obtain a FISA order. If the agent lacks the grounds
for such an order (or simply wants to avoid the trouble of complying with the statute), the
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believed that the fourth amendment required a search warrant or other
court order to authorize law enforcement use of a pen register or derivative
evidence even where, as in Smith, the telephone company was eager and
willing to "provide information, facilities or technical assistance."
C The Gap in FISA
The result intended by FISA's amendment to Title III can be stated sim-
ply. First, national security and federal law enforcement officials would
incur both civil and criminal liability if they conducted pen register sur-
veillance without a warrant or other court order issued pursuant to FISA if
sought for national security purposes or issued pursuant to the fourth
amendment and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 if sought for law
enforcement purposes. 4  Second, a telephone company that conducted
such surveillance on behalf of federal or state law enforcement officials in
the absence of a warrant or other court order would be civilly liable to the
subscriber whose privacy was invaded. 45 As a practical matter, therefore,
no such surveillance could be conducted without a court order.
Concededly, Congress left a loophole in this scheme. Pen register sur-
veillance by state law enforcement officials is not regulated by either Title
III or FISA. 46 Furthermore, a literal reading of the "directed assistance"
provision indicates that a telephone company would not be civilly liable if
it conducted such surveillance at the request of state officials in the absence
of a court order. 47 Prior to Smith v. Maryland, however, this loophole was
agent could simply ask another F.B.I. agent who is assigned to law enforcement duties (or
even a local police officer) to request that the telephone company install the register. If the
telephone company complies, the careful balance Congress sought to attain between na-
tional security and individual privacy is nullified.
144. See notes 127-30 and accompanying text supra.
145. See notes 138-39 and accompanying text supra. Although Congress chose to ex-
empt state officials from FISA's criminal and civil liability provisions, see note 130 supra,
there is nothing in FISA's legislative history suggesting that Congress intended to permit a
telephone company, in the absence of a warrant, to do for state officials what the amend-
ment to 18 U.S.C. § 251 i(2)(a)(ii) (1976) prohibits a company from doing for national secur-
ity officials.
146. Pen register surveillance is not regulated by Title Ii, see notes 107-08 supra, and
FISA's criminal and civil liability provisions are inapplicable to state officials. See notes
113, 130 supra. Thus, pen register surveillance by state officials is unregulated by FISA as
well as by Title III. Nevertheless, absent telephone company cooperation, state officials are
unlikely to conduct such surveillance without a warrant. To do so would require either an
illegal trespass onto the suspect's premises or an unauthorized use of telephone company
facilities.
147. Telephone company assistance to a state official conducting pen register surveil-
lance would constitute neither an "interception" under Title III nor "electronic surveillance"
under FISA. See note 146 supra. Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(iii) (Supp. 11 1978) would
not be applicable to such assistance.
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seemingly insignificant. If such surveillance violates the fourth amend-
ment, as Congress apparently believed,' 48 evidence derived from the pen
register would be suppressed. Thus, state officials would have little incen-
tive to seek telephone company cooperation absent a warrant. But the
holding in Smith v. Maryland, that if the telephone company agrees to
conduct the surveillance, law enforcement use of a pen register is not a
fourth amendment "search" and therefore need not be authorized by a
search warrant,149 has confounded congressional expectations and has par-
tially nullified Congress' intent to subject all governmental pen register
surveillance, state as well as federal, to a warrant requirement. As a result
of Smith, if the telephone company cooperates, state law enforcement use
of pen registers is currently subject to no federal constitutional or legisla-
tive restraints. 150
This is not to suggest that the Supreme Court erred in not applying
FISA to the facts in Smith. The use of the pen register in Smith preceded
the enactment of FISA by several years. Still, it is curious that none of the
opinions in Smith contain any mention of FISA. In the past, the Court has
often looked to existing federal legislation in assessing the constitutionality
of federal or state law enforcement techniques and procedures.' -" Further,
one cannot but wonder whether the Court considered the impact its deci-
sion might have on Congress' effort in FISA to subject all law enforcement
use of pen registers to a warrant requirement. The absence of any refer-
ence to FISA in the dissenting opinions is particularly puzzling. Both dis-
sents chastise the majority for failing to consider whether the type of
nonwarrant surveillance conducted in Smith is one of the risks a person
"should be forced to assume in a free and open society."' 152 Significantly,
the language and legislative history of FISA demonstrate that Congress
148. See notes 123-43 and accompanying text supra.
149. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
150. The Smith decision does not appear to effect the congressional scheme to impose a
court order requirement on all federal use of pen registers.
151. There are numerous examples. In United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415
(1976), the Court held that it was constitutional for federal agents to arrest a defendant
without a warrant, despite ample opportunity to obtain a warrant prior to the arrest. The
Court cited 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a)(3) (1976), which authorizes such arrests, as persuasive au-
thority. In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971), the Court held that it was
constitutional for federal agents to equip an informer with a transmitter and thereby over-
hear his conversation with a suspect without first obtaining a warrant. In upholding the
constitutionality of the surveillance, which had been conducted several years prior to enact-
ment of Title III, the Court cited Title III's consensual interception provision as persuasive
authority.
152. 99 S. Ct. at 2588 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See id at 2583-84 (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing).
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considered that very question and concluded that such surveillance should
be unlawful unless authorized by a warrant. Logically, one might have
expected the dissenting Justices to cite FISA as persuasive authority sup-
porting their viewpoint. Thus, the absence of any reference to FISA gives




Although the Supreme Court's reasoning in Smith v. Maryland has dis-
turbing long-range implications for personal privacy and has made a hash
of congressional intent, its immediate impact is uncertain. This section
will discuss the probable implications of the decision respecting federal
and state use of pen registers.
A. Federal Implications
L The FISA "Court Order" Requirement
Federal law enforcement use of pen registers constitutes "electronic sur-
veillance" as defined by FISA.'I 4 Such surveillance is unlawful and ex-
poses the agents and cooperating telephone company to criminal or civil
liability unless it is authorized by a "search warrant or court order.'
Thus, while the Smith decision removed any constitutional search warrant
requirement, FISA still requires a "court order" to authorize such surveil-
lance. Nowhere in FISA's statutory language or legislative history did
Congress specify what type of "court order," other than a search warrant,
was contemplated. Nevertheless, several aspects of FISA support the in-
ference that the phrase "search warrant or court order" was intended to
mean "search warrant, FISA electronic surveillance order or Title III in-
terception order."
First, FISA's central purpose is to specify when and how an "order ap-
proving electronic surveillance" may be obtained, how evidence derived
from such court order may be used, and how suppression issues respecting
153. FISA was not mentioned during oral argument before the Supreme Court. The
only reference to FISA appearing anywhere in the Smith record is a passing reference in
petitioner's brief, citing FISA-related hearings as evidence of congressional concern for pri-
vacy. Brief for Petitioner at 19-20, Smith v. Maryland, 99 S. Ct. 2577 (1979).
154. See notes 116-18 and accompanying text supra.
155. See notes 127-30, 133 and accompanying text supra. FISA was placed in title 50
(War and National Defense) of the United States Code rather than title 18 (Crimes and
Criminal Procedure) to emphasize that FISA was not intended to govern law enforcement
procedures. See H.R. REP. No. 1283, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1978) (Select Intelligence
Committee). Nevertheless, FISA's definition of "electronic surveillance," and its criminal
liability provision, renders, the statute applicable to federal law enforcement use of pen reg-
isters.
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the order are to be litigated. 56 Title III's primary focus respecting an "or-
der authorizing the interception of a wire or oral communication" is simi-
lar.'57 Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that, as used in FISA, the term
"court order" refers exclusively to an electronic surveillance order, and
that, as used in Title III, "court order" refers exclusively to an interception
order, unless a contrary meaning can be derived from the context of the
statutes or their legislative history.'58
Second, FISA's statutory defense to a civil or criminal charge of illegal
electronic surveillance is that the surveillance was conducted "pursuant to
a search warrant or court order of a court of competent jurisdiction."''
59
FISA does not define the term "court of competent jurisdiction." How-
ever, Title III uses a similar term, "judge of competent jurisdiction," to
define those judges authorized by Title III or corresponding state statutes
to issue wiretapping or bugging orders.'6 If FISA's use of the term "court
of competent jurisdiction" was intended to mean "judge of competent ju-
risdiction," as defined in Title III, then the phrase "search warrant or court
order of a court of competent jurisdiction" appears to mean "search war-
156. FISA permits electronic surveillance without a court order only under narrow cir-
cumstances. 50 U.S.C § 1802 (Supp. 11 1978). The Act also provides for the establishment
of a special court to receive applications for electronic surveillance orders, id § 1803, and
specifies what the application for such an order must contain. Id § 1804. Additionally,
FISA enumerates what the order must contain, when it may be issued, and how it is to be
executed. Id § 1805. Congressional oversight of FISA-authorized electronic surveillance is
built into the statute, id §§ 1807-1880, and persons may be civilly and criminally liable for
conducting electronic surveillance except pursuant to a "search warrant or court order." Id
§§ 1809-1810. Concerning FISA's penalty provisions, see notes 159-65 and accompanying
text infra.
157. Although certain types of interceptions are exempted from the court order require-
ment, it is a crime to intercept communications unless such interception is authorized by
Title III. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1976). Title III regulates the manufacture of interception de-
vices, id § 2512, and authorizes their confiscation. Id § 2513. Moreover, Title III mandates
the exclusion of evidence derived from illegal interceptions. Id § 2515. The statute defines
when and by whom an interception order may be sought, id § 2516, and sets out what an
interception application and order must contain, how the order is to be executed, who must
be notified after the interceptions are terminated, and how suppression issues are to be liti-
gated. Id § 2518. Annual reports concerning interception orders are required, id at § 2519,
and there is a civil cause of action for those aggrieved by illegal interceptions. Id § 2520.
158. Until amended by FISA, neither Title III nor its legislative history contained the
term "court order." Instead, Title III referred to an "order authorizing interception." See,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516(1), 2518(1) (1976). Similarly, FISA refers primarily to an "order
approving electronic surveillance." See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (Supp. 11 1978). The use of
the term "court order" in FISA and its legislative history, including FISA's amendment to
18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(a)(ii) (Supp. II 1978) (the "directed assistance" provision), is discussed
at notes 155-56 and accompanying text supra.
159. See notes 127-29 and accompanying text supra.
160. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(9), 2518(1), (3) (1976).
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rant, FISA electronic surveillance order, or Title III interception order."6
Finally, the "directed assistance" provision, which permits a telephone
company to assist in the interception of communications or the conduct of
electronic surveillance only if the company has been provided with "a
court order directing such assistance signed by the authorizing judge," '62
itself provides additional support for the inference that the type of "court
order" referred to therein is restricted to FISA electronic surveillance or-
ders, Title III interception orders, or supplemental orders ancillary to a
FISA or Title III order. Three aspects of this provision support such an
inference. First, Title III employs the term "authorizing judge" to mean
the judge who has issued the interception order. 163 Second, in comment-
ing on the directed assistance provision, the Senate Intelligence Committee
noted that the order directing assistance need "not necessarily [be] the
same order as authorizes the actual surveillance."'' 64 Although this per-
mits the government to obtain telephone company assistance without re-
vealing to it all of the information contained in the Title III interception
order, it also implies that there must be a Title III interception order before
an order directing assistance can be obtained. Finally, the directed assist-
ance provision allows certain government officials to obtain cooperation
without a court order only if the official certifies, in writing, that an emer-
gency exists requiring interceptions or electronic surveillance before a Title
161. In the absence of an explicit congressional statement, one should be cautious about
inferring an intent to incorporate into FISA the definition of a similar but not identical term
contained in Title III. Several factors, however, do provide circumstantial evidence that this
was what Congress intended. First, when Congress enacted FISA, it also amended several
provisions of Title III. See notes 131-43 and accompanying text supra. Second, Congress
expressly intended FISA's civil and criminal liability provisions to mirror those of Title III.
See note 127 supra. Congress, therefore, considered FISA and Title III to be coextensive in
several important respects. Finally, the Senate draft of FISA, S. 1566, had provided that,
except for terms specifically defined in S. 1566, the definitions in Title III respecting the
interception of wire and oral communications would apply to FISA as well. See S. REP.
No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3973,
3985 (Intelligence Committee). Perhaps, therefore, FISA's use of the phrase "court of com-
petent jurisdiction" rather than "judge of competent jurisdiction" was simply a clerical error
by the Senate committees that drafted S. 1566. When the congressional conferees decided
not to incorporate Title III definitions, they may not have realized that they thereby stripped
the phrase "court of competent jurisdiction" of any express definition.
162. 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(a)(ii)(A) (Supp. I 1978). See notes 134-43 and accompanying
text supra.
163. The phrase "authorizing judge" appears in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976). See also id
§ 2518(l)(e).
164. S. REP. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 69, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3973, 4038.
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III or FISA order can be obtained.' 65
Congress enacted FISA with the understanding that the fourth amend-
ment required a search warrant to authorize pen register surveillance by
government officials even if the telephone company was willing to cooper-
ate in the absence of a warrant. 166 Ironically, if the phrase "search warrant
or court order" indeed means "search warrant, FISA electronic surveil-
lance order, or Title III interception order," then Congress, without realiz-
ing it, may have imposed precisely such a requirement, thereby rendering
Smith v. Maryland a nullity when applied to federal officials.'
6 7
2. The New York Telephone Dictum: Rule 57(b) and the All Writs
Act
The counter-argument to the preceding analysis is readily stated. If
Congress had intended to permit federal pen register surveillance only
when authorized by a search warrant, a Title III interception order, or a
FISA electronic surveillance order, it could have said so explicitly. Since it
did not, the phrase "search warrant or court order" must mean something
else.
It is here that the Smith Court's reliance on United States v. Miller,
68
the Bank Secrecy Act case, is particularly significant. The Bank Secrecy
Act compels banks to preserve their customers' bank records in order to
ensure their availability to the government.' 69 In Miller, the Court held
that, when a customer transacts business with a bank, he assumes the risk
that the bank will reveal those records to the government in compliance
with a subpoena.'7 I Therefore, the subpoena does not constitute a search,
and the customer lacks standing to contest its validity.'7 '
An application of Miller leads to the following analysis. The fourth
amendment does not require a search warrant to authorize pen register
surveillance when the telephone company cooperates because, by "volun-
tarily convey[ing] numerical information to the telephone company," any-
one using a telephone "assume[s] the risk that the company would reveal
to police the numbers he dialed."'7 2 Although FISA prohibits telephone
165. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B) (Supp. 11 1978). Aspects of the Title III and FISA
emergency surveillance provisions are discussed at note 141 supra.
166. See notes 122-43 and accompanying text supra.
167. The implications of Smith for state officials are discussed at notes 184-91 and ac-
companying text infra.
168. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). See notes 65-67 and accompanying text supra.
169. See notes 68-69 and accompanying text supra.
170. 425 U.S. at 442-43.
171. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra.
172. Smith v. Maryland, 99 S. Ct. at 2582. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
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companies from cooperating with federal officials in the absence of a
"search warrant or court order," the telephone user nevertheless "assumes
the risk" that the company will comply with a court order to provide
whatever assistance is needed to enable the government to discover the
"numerical information" the dialer "voluntarily conveys" to the company.
Logically, the telephone user would not even have standing to contest the
validity of the court order since the order, like the subpoena in Miller, is
not directed at the customer) 73 All the government need do, therefore, is
obtain a court order that is the functional equivalent of a subpoena.
74
In United States v. New York Telephone Co. ,175 the Supreme Court held
that a search warrant sufficed to authorize law enforcement pen register
surveillance 76 and that a federal district judge had the authority under the
All Writs Act' to issue an order compelling telephone company coopera-
tion.17 The Court found support for this conclusion in rule 57(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides: "If no procedure is
specifically prescribed by rule, the court may proceed in any manner not
inconsistent with these rules or with any applicable statute."' 79 The Court
commented, however, that "[w]e need not and do not decide whether Rule
57(b) by itself would authorize the issuance of pen register orders."' 8 °
Although this language was dictum in New York Telephone Co., the
Smith decision may have elevated it to black letter law. The Department
of Justice, in any event, regards it as such. It is now that agency's policy
that, when a pen register is sought, the government will apply for a court
order pursuant to rule 57(b) authorizing such surveillance and will simul-
taneously apply for an order pursuant to the All Writs Act compelling the
telephone company to provide the necessary information, facilities, and
assistance. 181
The suggested form for the rule 57(b) application recites only that law
enforcement agents have been engaged in an investigation of specified in-
dividuals for violations of specified crimes, that it is believed that these
173. Similarly, in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973), the Court, using
the same assumption of risk rationale, upheld an I.R.S. summons that required Couch's
accountant to produce Couch's financial records. See note 63 supra.
174. As discussed earlier, the analogy between bank records and pen registers is inapt.
See notes 68-84 and accompanying text supra.
175. 434 U.S. 159 (1977). See notes 11-14 and accompanying text supra.
176. 434 U.S. at 165-68.
177. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976). See note 14 supra.
178. 434 U.S. at 168-78.
179. FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b).
180. 434 U.S. at 170.
181. Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Philip P. Heymann, Chief of the
Criminal Division, Department of Justice (December 19, 1979).
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individuals use the targeted telephone to discuss or conduct criminal activ-
ity, and that the installation and use of the pen register may provide fur-
ther evidence of the crimes being investigated. 82 A showing of probable
cause is not required. 83 If the courts are willing to issue such orders then,
despite Congress' expectations and intent to the contrary, the government
will be able to conduct pen register surveillance almost at will.
B. State Implications
As a result of Smith, state law enforcement use of pen registers is subject
to no federal regulation at all.' This does not necessarily mean, however,
that state officials are not subject to any restrictions. Prior to Smith, some
states had insisted on a search warrant, supported by probable cause, to
authorize such surveillance.' 85 Other states can be expected to do likewise,
either by specific legislation or by court interpretation of state constitu-
tional or statutory provisions.1
86
Finally, even on the state level, the holding in Smith applies only to pen
register surveillance conducted by the telephone company at police request.
It is to the telephone company that a telephone user "convey[s] numerical
information," thereby "assum[ing] the risk that the company would reveal"
the information to the police. 87 If the police employ a pen register di-
rectly, without obtaining telephone company consent and cooperation, the
assumption of risk rationale does not apply. Such surveillance would,
therefore, constitute an illegal search and seizure and might expose the
police to criminal or civil liability under state law.
182. Id
183. Id
184. See notes 146-50 and accompanying text supra.
185. See, e.g., State v. Ramirez, 351 A.2d 566 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976); Commonwealth v.
Coviello, 362 Mass. 722, 291 N.E.2d 416 (1973).
186. In recent years, several state courts have interpreted their own laws and constitu-
tions more restrictively than have federal courts in interpreting analogous federal law. This
has been particularly true in such areas as electronic surveillance and search and seizure.
See, e.g., People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 567, 227 N.W.2d 511,514, cert. denied, 423 U.S.
878 (1975) (state constitution requires a warrant to authorize use of transmitter to monitor
consenting informer's conversation with suspect); State v. Opperman, 89 S.D. 25, 247
N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976) (state constitution requires suppression of evidence seized in a
search that the Supreme Court, in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), had
held did not violate the fourth amendment); State ex rel Arnold v. County Court, 51 Wisc.
2d 434, 187 N.W.2d 354 (1971) (state statute's consensual interception provision, though
worded identically to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1976), interpreted to require a warrant to au-
thorize evidentiary use of such interceptions). See generally 18 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2507
(1976). In addition, it is noteworthy that while Title III authorized states to enact legislation
permitting state law enforcement agents to intercept wire and oral communications, 28 states
have not done so. See C. FISHMAN, supra note 11, at 5-6.
187. Smith v. Maryland, 99 S. Ct. at 2582 (emphasis supplied).
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Thus, the practical impact of Smith on state use of pen registers may
depend upon the attitudes and policies of the nation's telephone compa-
nies. When police request pen register surveillance for reasons that coin-
cide with a business purpose for which a company would utilize a pen
register on its own initiative, cooperation may be forthcoming. For exam-
ple, in Smith, the company did at police request what it probably would
have done on its own had the recipient of the harassing calls complained
directly to the company.18  As a rule, however, it is unlikely that tele-
phone companies will install pen registers upon police request. In recent
years, the nation's telephone companies have resisted cooperating with law
enforcement even when directed to do so by court order.'89 Such resist-
ance predated the amendment to Title III that imposes civil liability on a
telephone company that provides "information, facilities, or technical
assistance" to law enforcement officials unless ordered to so do by a
court. '9 That legislation will, in all likelihood, increase telephone com-
pany reluctance to conduct pen register surveillance at police request in
the absence of a court order.' 9 '
Thus, despite Smith v. Maryland, state law enforcement officials will be
able to conduct pen register surveillance only by obtaining a search war-
rant or other court order - not because the fourth amendment requires it,
not because any statute requires it, not because Congress intended it, since
Smith effectively nullified that intent, but because the telephone company
insists upon it.
Whether Smith has any significant impact on the state level, therefore,
will depend upon whether state courts are willing, without requiring a
showing of probable cause, to issue orders similar to those permitted under
188. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
189. See, e.g., United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977) (pen register);
Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977) (in-progress trace);
United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976) (pen register);
Application of United States, 427 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1970) (Title III warrant); Application of
United States, 458 F. Supp. 1174 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (pen register); Re In Progress Trace, 76
N.J. 255, 386 A.2d 1295 (1978) (in-progress trace). In each case, the order directed that the
telephone company be compensated at the prevailing rates, so company resistance could not
have been based on financial reasons. Presumably, the companies sought doubly to protect
themselves from possible subsequent civil suits brought by the subscribers.
190. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii) (Supp. 11 1978).
191. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii) (Supp. 11 1978) apparently does not subject a telephone
company to civil liability for cooperating with state pen register requests. See note 130 and
accompanying text supra. Nevertheless, the recent resistance to court orders, see note 189
supra, suggests that the nation's telephone companies are unlikely to be willing to test the
applicability of that statute to such a situation.
19801
Catholic University Law Review
rule 57(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the All Writs
Act.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that when a telephone
company, acting at the informal request of the police, uses a pen register to
make a record of the local numbers dialed from a suspect's phone, use of
the pen register does not constitute a "search"; therefore, the fourth
amendment is irrelevant, and no search warrant is required. It would be
melodramatic to contend that the decision seriously and immediately jeop-
ardizes individual privacy. The decision is directly applicable only if the
telephone company complies with a police request. Telephone companies
are unlikely to do so, absent circumstances under which a company would
have used a pen register on its own initiative.
Nevertheless, Smith v. Maryland is troubling for several reasons. In ar-
riving at its decision, the Supreme Court relied on dubious factual assump-
tions, nullified congressional intent, and created an absurd anamoly in
federal law. Worse, it extended the "assumption of risk" approach to the
fourth amendment in a fashion that has unsettling implications on the
question of the right to privacy generally. Finally, it is disturbing to real-
ize that, as a result of Smith v. Maryland, a not insignificant aspect of per-
sonal privacy is protected, not by legislation or by the mandate of the
fourth amendment, but only by the benevolence of the local telephone
company.
[Vol. 29:557
